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Abstract Fossil fuel subsidy reform has in recent years been addressed by international
economic organizations including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The two organiza-
tions have differed significantly in how they define fossil fuel subsidies. The IMF’s defi-
nition constitutes a radical break with previous definitions by including environmental
externalities, while the OECD’s is more conventional. The article explores the factors that
explain why these international economic organizations have approached fossil fuel sub-
sidies so differently. The exact definition of fossil fuel subsidies is contested. Furthermore,
fossil fuels subsidies can be framed in ways that emphasize, respectively, their macroe-
conomic, fiscal, environmental, and distributive consequences. The article finds that
institutional interaction lifted OECD involvement in fossil fuel subsidies to a new level,
whereas the impetus to address fossil fuel subsidies within the IMF came largely from the
IMF staff. In both cases, the organization’s bureaucracy constituted the most important
factor shaping how the organizations addressed such subsidies and hence the main reason
why they differ in how they approach fossil fuel subsidies.
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All over the world, governments subsidize the consumption and the production of fossil
fuels. Notwithstanding the environmental consequences of these subsidies, the interna-
tional push for fossil fuel subsidy reform has come from economic international organi-
zations (IOs), particularly the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), rather than environmental institu-
tions.1 While other institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the
World Bank have also been heavily involved in fossil fuel subsidies, the present article
focuses on the IMF and the OECD since they are the two institutions that—in spite of
similarities—differ most in their approach to fossil fuel subsidies. The IMF has adopted an
approach that constitutes a radical break with previous definitions and defines any non-
pricing of externalities as a subsidy, while the OECD uses a more conventional definition.
The IMF approach led to an estimate of global fossil fuel subsidies of US$5300 billion,
compared to other estimates of approximately US$550 billion (IEA 2014; Coady et al.
2015). This difference is puzzling considering the similarities between the institutions,
notably their shared liberal economic worldview and the fact that the same set of indus-
trialized countries prevail within the collective principal (Bernstein 2001; Vreeland 2007).
Moreover, unlike the IMF, the OECD has a record of addressing environmental problems
(Lehtonen 2007). So, if anything, one would expect the OECD to be more inclined to
incorporate environmental concerns rather than the IMF.
Notwithstanding agreement that fossil fuel subsidies should be reformed, little agree-
ment exists on the exact definition of such subsidies (Koplow 2009). An important aspect
of the definition of fossil fuel subsidies is the emphasis on, respectively, the environmental,
fiscal, macroeconomic and distributive consequences. If the IO’s engagement was moti-
vated by the fiscal and economic consequences, why have they only addressed fossil fuel
subsidies as a major issue since the late 2000s, when the policies today characterized as
fossil fuel subsidies have in fact existed for decades? Environmental concerns constitute
another possible factor, but if it was the main driver, environmental institutions should all
things equal be more involved than economic IOs, which is not the case.
The growing body of the literature on fossil fuel subsidies and their reform has pre-
dominantly focused on domestic factors (Victor 2009; Bazilian and Onyeji 2012; Cheon
et al. 2013). The issue of international economic institutions in fossil fuel subsidy reform
has been overlooked—except for treating them as one factor among many causing
domestic fossil fuel subsidy reform (Beaton and Lontoh 2010).
To address the above-mentioned puzzles and gaps, this article will seek to answer the
following research question: Which factors explain why and how the IMF and the OECD
have addressed fossil fuel subsidies? The article aims at identifying the factors that induced
the economic IOs to address fossil fuel subsidies and influenced how they defined these
subsidies. The factors studied include a hitherto overlooked factor in the IO literature:
interaction with other international institutions, as well as the theoretically derived factors
of IO bureaucratic culture and policy entrepreneurs, principal-agent autonomy, and deci-
sion-making procedures.
The article proceeds with a discussion of the various definitions of fossil fuel subsidies.
Subsequently, the article develops a theoretical framework for studying the economic IOs’
efforts to address fossil fuel subsidies, a framework combining theories of institutional
1 Some environmental institutions have addressed fossil fuel subsidies, including the Kyoto Protocol
(1997), whose provisions on the issue did not lead to concrete measures.
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interaction and theories of IO behaviour. The theoretical framework is applied to the cases
of the OECD and the IMF efforts to address fossil fuel subsidies.
2 Fossil fuel subsidies and their definition
Although fossil fuel subsidies2 are widely recognized as problematic, there is no agreement
on their definition (OECD Secretariat 2010). While policies lowering the fuel price paid by
consumers below the market price undisputedly constitute a fossil fuel subsidy, several
other types of policies may be defined as fossil fuel subsidies, depending on the definition
used (van Asselt and Skovgaard 2016).
There are two important distinctions for classifying the definitions of fossil fuel sub-
sidies: first, the distinction between the definitions that define a fossil fuel subsidy in terms
of the benefits conferred on a specific group and the definitions that define it in terms of a
price-gap between the actual price and a benchmark price (Koplow 2009; OECD Secre-
tariat 2010). The conferred-benefits approaches focus on individual policies, while the
price-gap approaches focus on fuel prices as the unit of analysis. The price-gap approach
identifies fossil fuel subsidies in terms of impact on consumer prices, more precisely
whether prices are below a benchmark price. The benchmark price is based on the inter-
national price of a given fossil fuel, often including distribution, value-added tax and/or a
tax corresponding to the externalities stemming from fuel use (van Asselt and Skovgaard
2016). Several countries have fossil fuel subsidies according to both definitions, but
numerous countries will only be included under conferred-benefits definitions and not
under price-gap definitions (Koplow 2009) and vice versa. The definition used also
determines the estimated size of estimate of global fossil fuel subsidies.
The second distinction differentiates between producer subsidies (directed at the pro-
ducers of fossil fuels) and consumer subsidies (directed at the users of fossil fuels).
Consumer subsidies include reduced electricity prices, fuels sold at below-market prices,
etc. Producer subsidies include direct financial transfers, tax rebates and loans to fossil fuel
extraction, etc. Consumer subsidies are concentrated in the developing countries, while
producer subsidies are also common in the industrialized countries.
Arguably, fossil fuel subsidies can be viewed as an ‘essentially contested concept’,
whose criteria for application cannot be agreed upon, but which depends upon differing
normative points of view (Connolly 1983). Defining a policy as a fossil fuel subsidy
implies that it should be reformed, which is one reason why actors promote definitions that
identify different policies as fossil fuel subsidies.
The contestation over fossil fuel subsidies may concern their environmental, fiscal,
macroeconomic and distributive consequences (for a related typology, see Lockwood
2015). Regarding environmental consequences, the focus has been on climate change as
well as local air pollution (e.g. Coady et al. 2015). Concerning fiscal consequences, most
fossil fuel subsidies constitute public expenditure, either as direct spending or as revenue
foregone (e.g. lower tax rates). Regarding the macroeconomic consequences, fossil fuel
subsidies have been framed as distorting the optimal allocation of resources within society,
for instance by encouraging over-consumption (see Clements et al. 2013, 15–19). While
the previous consequences of fossil fuels are negative, its distributive consequences have
2 This article uses the term ‘fossil fuel subsidies’, while the term ‘energy subsidies’ (also covering subsidies
to renewables, nuclear, etc.) has also been used, often—for instance by the IMF—referring mainly to fossil
fuel subsidies.
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been framed positively in terms of poverty reduction policies (in policy debates rather than
academic literature) as well as negatively in terms of being regressive (for a discussion of
the positive and negative distributional consequences, see Lockwood 2015, 479).
3 Theories of IO behaviour
A strand of the international relations literature focuses on IOs as actors in their own right,
independent of state behaviour (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004;
Park and Vetterlein 2010). Biermann et al. (2009b) distinguish between three kinds of
influences on IOs: problem structure, extra-organizational (mainly member states), and the
organization itself. Whereas the problem structure (fossil fuel subsidies and their reform) is
constant between the IOs analysed here, both extra- and intra-organizational factors vary.
Intra-organizational influences explain the role of IOs in terms of their organizational
culture and policy entrepreneurs within the bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore 2004;
Park and Vetterlein 2010). Extra-organizational influences mainly explain the role of IOs
in terms of their status as agents contracted by principals (the member states) to perform a
function that will benefit the principals (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006).
The present article argues that most of the literature on IO output ignores the interaction
between international institutions (Young 2011; but see Van de Graaf 2016).3 The
developing literature on the dyadic interaction between institutions (Oberthu¨r and Stokke
2011) and on the fragmentation and coupling of institutions into ‘regime complexes’
(Biermann et al. 2009a; Keohane and Victor 2011) rests on the assumption that interna-
tional institutions cannot be understood without including their relationships to other
institutions. Thus, interaction with other international institutions influences when and how
an IO addresses fossil fuel subsidies. The two IOs differ in the OECD being requested by
the G20 to study the scope of global fossil fuel subsidies and has become something akin to
the secretariat of the G20, while the IMF was not commissioned by any institution.
Proposition 1 Interaction with international institutions explains the difference in how
the two IOs addressed fossil fuel subsidies.
Beyond institutional interaction, explanations based on existing theories will be
explored. Regarding intra-bureaucratic factors, the sociological institutionalist IO literature
focuses on the differing perspectives of IO bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore 2004;
Park and Vetterlein 2010). The OECD has a track record in dealing with environmental
issues going back to the 1970s (see below) and has been crucial in promoting the paradigm
of ‘liberal environmentalism’, stressing economic instruments and compatibility between
economic growth and environmental protection (Bernstein 2001). The IMF has little
experience regarding environmental issues and is more strongly influenced by neoclassical
economics than the OECD (Chwieroth 2008; Howarth and Sadeh 2011). Thus, we should
expect the OECD to frame fossil fuel subsidies in terms of environmental consequences to
a larger degree than the IMF.
Proposition 2a The organizational culture of the IOs explains the difference in how they
addressed fossil fuel subsidies.
3 Including IOs and other intergovernmental institutions such as the G20, but excluding non-governmental
organizations such as the Global Subsidies Initiative, which are beyond the scope of this article.
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Policy entrepreneurs (understood as actors investing resources in order to change pol-
icy; Kingdon 2003, 122–124) operating within the organizations may promote and frame
issues in ways that fit with existing ideas and lead to particular policy responses (Ch-
wieroth 2008), in this case how the organization addresses fossil fuel subsidies.
Proposition 2b Differences in the degree of policy entrepreneurship among the staff of
the IOs explain the difference in how they addressed fossil fuel subsidies.
Turning to extra-bureaucratic factors, principal-agent theory focuses on the degree of IO
autonomy from principals as the main explanatory factor of the ways in which the IOs have
addressed fossil fuel subsidies. Since the IMF controls its own resources and operates more
independently of the member states than the OECD (Dreher 2004; Busch 2009), one would
expect the IMF staff to be more able to influence IO behaviour on fossil fuel subsidies than
the OECD bureaucracy.
Proposition 3a The degree of autonomy from principals explains the difference in how
the IOs addressed fossil fuel subsidies.
Finally, membership and voting rules within the collective principal of an IO may
influence how it addresses fossil fuel subsidies. The OECD covers only industrialized
countries, and while the IMF has a broader set of principals covering most countries, its
voting rules grant the major industrialized countries a position close to a combined veto
power.4 Therefore, the IMF would be expected to reflect the preferences of the largest
industrialized countries to a larger degree than the OECD.
Proposition 3b Membership and voting rules within the collective principal of an IO
explain the difference in how they addressed fossil fuel subsidies.
4 Operationalization
The OECD and the IMF treatment of fossil fuel subsidies have been analysed on the basis
of official documents and 20 key informant interviews. The key informants are civil
servants from the OECD, the IMF and member states characterized by strong engagement
with fossil fuel subsidy reform (the USA, the UK, India, and Sweden). At both IOs, a
limited number of officials have fossil fuel subsidies as their main responsibility, and in
both cases I have interviewed a significant share of these officials (a total of 10), as well as
officials having fossil fuel subsidies as a smaller but nevertheless important part of their
responsibilities, such as officials working with IMF country programs. They were inter-
viewed during the period 2014–2016 at the headquarters of the two organizations, in the
national capitals, via phone or email, and at the national representations to the OECD. The
interviews were semi-structured, with the informants being asked the same general
questions as well as more specific questions regarding their individual responsibilities. The
analysis of the documents goes back to the first documents addressing fossil fuel or energy
subsidies, be it as a distinct issue or as one among many.
The analysis has uncovered how the institutions have defined fossil fuel subsidies as
well as the processes leading to the institutions addressing fossil fuel subsidies. Regarding
the former, the analysis focuses on the IOs’ definition of fossil fuel subsidies as well as
4 Whereas the IOs generally addressed fossil fuel subsidies in their member states as a group, the country-
specific interventions by the IMF targeted individual developing countries with little influence within the IO.
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how they have framed such subsidies in terms of environmental, fiscal, macroeconomic or
distributive impact. The definitions and frames have mainly been identified on the basis of
official documents, whereas the mapping of the policy processes has relied on the
interviews.
5 International efforts to reform fossil fuel subsidies
Fossil fuel subsidies became a high-priority international issue only when the G20 leaders
in September 2009 in Pittsburgh adopted the commitment ‘[t]o phase out and rationalize
over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing targeted support for
the poorest’ (G20 2009). This commitment was driven by US leadership and adopted in a
context of high oil prices (interview with former senior US Treasury official, 6 May 2014)
and importantly did not provide a definition of fossil fuel subsidies. Yet policies now
characterized as fossil fuel subsidies have been in place for decades. Multilateral devel-
opment banks and the IMF have long advocated that countries phase out ‘poorly targeted’
subsidies of all kinds without using the concept of fossil fuel subsidies (e.g. IMF 2004).
The G20 commitment was most influential in the processes it set in motion. The IEA,
the OECD, OPEC, and the World Bank were tasked with measuring the magnitude and the
consequences of such subsidies, a request which moved the issue up their respective
agendas. The G20 member states committed themselves to submitting strategies and
timetables for phasing out their fossil fuel subsidies (G20 2009). Furthermore, in
November 2009, the governments of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation countries
adopted a commitment similar to the G20’s. Although environmental institutions addressed
fossil fuel subsidy reform indirectly and directly in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015
Sustainable Development Goals, but only as a possible means of implementation (van
Asselt and Skovgaard 2016; see also van Asselt and Kulovesi, this issue).
6 The IMF
The IMF has traditionally not emphasized environmental protection. The considerable
autonomy and power of the IMF is—according to Barnett and Finnemore (2004)—based
on its independence from state funding and its authority on economic matters. The eco-
nomic training of the IMF officials is fundamental to its bureaucratic culture and how the
institution perceives and acts upon the world (Chwieroth 2008).
Roughly speaking, IMF policy has addressed fossil fuel along two strands, both
increasing in importance. The first strand focuses on the lack of a carbon price (and
environmental taxes generally) and on solving this problem from the perspective of an
economist, i.e. ‘getting the price right’ (interview with IMF senior official, 17 February
2015). Prior to 2008, the IMF only occasionally addressed energy subsidies (rather than
fossil fuel subsidies) in policy reports5 (Gupta et al. 2000; Baig et al. 2007) and in country-
specific policy recommendations (e.g. IMF 2004). Energy subsidies were framed in terms
of fiscal and macroeconomic impact, without referring to environmental impacts. Thus,
subsidizing fossil fuels was framed as similar to subsidizing any other product. The IMF
used price-gap approaches for measuring all kinds of subsidies and did not include
5 Which were not part of IMF programmes but more analytical.
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externalities in its fuel benchmark prices (e.g. Said and Leigh 2006). Internally, from 2005
fossil fuel subsidies gained increasing attention, particularly driven by the fiscal impact of
high oil prices and the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Group within the Fiscal Affairs
Department, and consequently the IMF stressed the fiscal impact of fossil fuel subsidies
while stressing the importance of mitigating measures to protect the poor (interview with
IMF official, 25 February 2015). Thus, the oil prices provided policy entrepreneurs within
the IMF with a window of opportunity.
In 2008, the IMF published its first official publications6 that addressed fuel subsidies as
a distinct concept and included environmental externalities (priced at US$0.50 per litre
gasoline and diesel; IMF 2008a, b). After 2008, the IMF increasingly addressed fossil fuel
subsidies and their environmental impact, while maintaining the emphasis on fiscal and
macroeconomic consequences. This increase was due to policy entrepreneurship within the
organization. The notion of including environmental externalities in measures of efficient
fuel prices had been floating around for some time among a circle of economists working
for the IMF, the World Bank, the US government and various environmental think tanks in
Washington, DC (interview with senior IMF economist, 24 April 2014). The IMF econ-
omists within this group also promoted the notion of including undercharging for envi-
ronmental costs in a broad definition of fossil fuel subsidies, and this issue has received
considerable attention from IMF management since 20117 under Christine Lagarde (in-
terview with senior IMF economist, 24 April 2014). Lagarde had a more active interest in
climate politics than her predecessors, which opened a window of opportunity for the
above-mentioned economists (including members of the Poverty and Social Impact
Analysis Group). In 2013, they published the report ‘Energy subsidy reform: Lessons and
implications’ (Clements et al. 2013), which raised the IMF’s engagement with fossil fuel
subsidies to a new level. Crucially, the report used a price-gap approach based on a
benchmark price including both value-added tax and the social cost of externalities, par-
ticularly climate change and other environmental externalities. This approach was adopted
on the basis of the IMF’s work on fiscal instruments (within the Fiscal Affairs Department)
and the emphasis on—as the title of a key publication on fossil fuel subsidies says—
‘Getting energy prices right’ (Parry et al. 2014).8
The findings of the report were updated in a 2015 IMF working paper (Coady et al.
2015), whose estimate of global subsidies at US$5300 billion9 in 2015—compared to
estimates of US$1900 billion in the 2013 report (Clements et al. 2013) and US$550 billion
in the IEA’s 2014 World Energy Outlook (IEA 2014)—received significant attention. This
increase was due to revising the assessments of externalities—especially air pollution—
upwards. Local air pollution accounted for three quarters of the externality and climate
change for one quarter (Coady et al. 2015). Regarding climate change, the social cost of
emitting a ton of carbon dioxide was estimated at US$35 (based on Parry et al. 2014), a
figure originating from the US government’s Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of
Carbon (2013). The US$35 ton figure is considered a low estimate of the social costs (see
Tol 2011), yet it is much higher than actual levels of carbon taxation.
According to the IMF’s definition, practically all states subsidize fossil fuels, even
countries with carbon taxes that do not fully price in externalities. Industrialized countries
6 IMF working papers from 2006 to 2007 by IMF staff had addressed fuel subsidies, but as working papers
they did not require official IMF endorsement.
7 After the G20 asked the OECD to analyse fossil fuel subsidies.
8 The IMF offers an online course on energy subsidy reform based on these publications.
9 Also including the OECD’s estimate of producer subsidies for 2011 being worth US$16.8 billion.
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account for a quarter of energy subsidies, and emerging and developing Asia for half
(Coady et al. 2015). Consequently, the 2013 and 2015 reports break with previous analyses
which—using different definitions—identified fossil fuel subsidies as primarily a devel-
oping country phenomenon. The reports also contradicted the claims of influential IMF
member states (including the UK and Japan) that they do not subsidize fossil fuels (G20
2012), something which made the report unpopular among the governments of these
countries but popular among non-governmental organizations. This divergence under-
scores the limited member state influence on the reports (Proposition 3b). The influence of
institutional interaction was also limited (Proposition 1), as the IMF was not requested by
the G20 to analyse fossil fuel subsidies.
More important were the policy entrepreneurs within the IMF—particularly the Fiscal
Affairs Department (Proposition 2a), who framed the environmental impact in macroe-
conomic terms, and thus successfully defined fossil fuel subsidies in a way resonating with
the organization’s bureaucratic culture (Proposition 2b) as well as the professional back-
ground of IMF officials. It is difficult to distinguish the influence of the IMF’s bureaucratic
culture from the professional background of its officials, since they lead to similar positions
due to shared roots in neoclassical economics. The negative fiscal consequences were still
emphasized. Regarding distributive consequences, the IMF framed fossil fuel subsidies as
a highly ineffective way of supporting low-income households.
The second strand consists of bilateral interactions with countries having fiscal prob-
lems exacerbated by fossil fuel subsidies and includes policy recommendations and
Extended Credit Facility Arrangements inter alia promoting subsidy reform to improve
fiscal balances (interview with IMF senior official, 17 February 2015). Over the last
10 years, fossil fuel subsidies have been addressed in an increasing number of IMF rec-
ommendations to individual countries (see Table 1) and have increasingly been treated as
distinct from other kinds of subsidies. The IMF suggested phasing out such subsidies as
they were an inefficient, fiscally costly, and often economically distorting way of providing
welfare benefits (interview with IMF officials, 9 April 2014). The 2013–2016 IMF
Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for Burkina Faso constitutes an example of this,
with detailed recommendations on how Burkina Faso should liberalize the government-
fixed fuel prices (IMF 2015; interview with senior IMF official 22 June 2016). This strand
mainly emphasizes the fiscal consequences of the subsidies, while also stressing the dis-
tributional (both positive and negative) and macroeconomic consequences. Environmental
consequences (including local externalities) have been less accentuated. Regarding
Burkina Faso, the IMF policy was developed by local IMF officials and officials from the
Fiscal Affairs Department and focused on what the IMF refers to as pre-tax subsidies,
Table 1 IMF reports on fossil fuel subsidies




0 0 1 1 1 4 6 3 8
General reports addressing fossil fuel
subsidies
1 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
… of which solely address fossil fuel
subsidies
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
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namely the subsidies lowering consumer prices below the international market price plus
distribution costs, not the absence of full pricing of the externalities (interview with senior
IMF official 22 June 2016).
7 The OECD
The OECD’s membership consists of 35 industrialized countries. The term ‘OECD’ refers
to the entirety of the OECD, including the OECD Council (consisting of member state
representatives, committees, working groups, etc., which report to the Council), as well as
the OECD Secretariat, an intergovernmental bureaucracy constituting an independent
actor. The Secretariat staff drafts all OECD publications, which are then subject to peer
review in OECD committees. Those publications that represent the opinion of the OECD
as a whole pass through consensus-based approval by the member states, while those that
represent the opinion of the OECD Secretariat need approval only from the Secretary
General (Ruffing 2010).
The OECD Environment Directorate has for four decades been a key actor in crafting
environmental policy solutions based on environmental (predominantly neoclassical)
economics (Ruffing 2010). The Environment Directorate was instrumental in developing
the paradigm of liberal environmentalism, which is prevalent within global environmental
policy and predicates international environmental protection on a liberal economic order
(Bernstein 2001). Since the OECD does not possess hard, legal instruments to induce states
to change policy, the OECD Secretariat and its Environment Directorate relies on softer
methods such as learning, socialization into norms and peer review (Lehtonen 2007; Busch
2009). The OECD Secretariat is increasingly acting as a kind of secretariat to the G20,
providing analyses of key issues, including fossil fuel subsidies (see also Lesage and Van
de Graaf 2013).
Crucially, the OECD tends to talk about ‘support’ rather than ‘subsidies’, since the term
subsidy is seen as referring to a smaller set of measures than support (supported fuels can
still be priced above the world market price) and since it may be legally problematic in
relation to World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes to define a measure as a subsidy
(interview with OECD officials, 29 April 2015; see also Meyer, this issue). The OECD
uses the term fossil fuel support in the sense that others use fossil fuel subsidies, which is
evident in the joint reports to the G20 on fossil fuel subsidies authored by the OECD,
World Bank, IEA, and OPEC (IEA et al. 2010, 2011). Hence, when analysing how the
OECD addressed fossil fuel subsidies, this article will focus on its efforts regarding what it
itself refers to as fossil fuel support.
The OECD addressed fossil fuel subsidies before the G20 commitment as part of the
regular environmental performance reviews of individual member states, studies of pricing
policies and more general studies.10 These efforts tended to categorize fossil fuel subsidies
together with other subsidies damaging to the environment, such as agricultural subsidies
(OECD 2005).
In the summer of 2009—before the Pittsburgh summit—an OECD report modelled the
climate change (and economic) impact of eliminating the subsidies measured by the IEA
(OECD 2009), thus constituting a result of institutional interaction driven by the OECD.
Furthermore, institutional interaction in terms of the G20 requesting the OECD Secretariat
10 In 1999, the OECD discussed fossil fuel subsidy reform as an instrument to achieve the Kyoto Protocol
targets (OECD 1999).
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(among others) to analyse the scope of fossil fuel subsidies and suggestions for the
implementation of this initiative lifted OECD involvement to a new level (interview with
OECD officials, 29 April 2015). It was only following the G20 commitment that the
member states gave the OECD Secretariat the mandate to scrutinize their national fossil
fuel subsidies (interview with OECD officials, 29 April 2015). At a later stage, the decision
by the G20 members that have so far committed to undergo a voluntary peer review of their
fossil fuel subsidies (including China, Germany, Mexico, and the USA) to invite the OECD
Secretariat to chair those peer reviews once again lifted the OECD Secretariat involvement
to a new level. Since institutional interaction constitutes the most important factor
increasing OECD interest in fossil fuel subsidies without much influence on how the
OECD addressed the issue, Proposition 1 is more relevant regarding the timing of OECD
involvement than the content of this involvement. In the following years, the OECD
Secretariat arranged workshops for representative of member states and reported (indi-
vidually and with IEA, OPEC, and the World Bank) to the G20 on fossil fuel subsidies
(OECD Secretariat 2010, 2011; IEA et al. 2011).
Member states have not been directly involved (Proposition 3a), as the important OECD
texts were published representing only the OECD Secretariat. Yet, member states played
an indirect role by limiting how far the OECD staff could go (interview with Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 30 April 2015). When it came to drafting the reports,
especially the country-specific ones, the OECD staff collaborated with the World Bank and
the IEA, which in this way influenced the OECD approach to the subject (interview with
OECD officials, 29 April 2015). The Economics Department (the most influential OECD
Directorate) and the Environment Directorate have also focused on fossil fuel support in,
respectively, their ‘Economic Surveys’ and ‘Environmental Performance Reviews’, which
analyse individual OECD member states.
The lead Directorate was the Trade and Agriculture Directorate in close collaboration
with the Environment Directorate and the Centre for Tax Policy. The Trade and Agri-
culture Directorate’s prominent role is due to their agricultural subsidy expertise. Because
of this institutional legacy, the OECD definition of fossil fuel subsidies is derived from the
OECD definition of agricultural subsidies, again derived from the World Trade Organi-
zation’s definition of subsidies (of all kinds) as direct transfers, fiscal incentives and
provision of goods and services (OECD Secretariat 2005). The past experience of working
with agricultural subsidies was entrenched in the organizational culture and hence influ-
enced the choice of a conferred-benefits approach and the general framing of fossil fuel
subsidies. Importantly, the OECD Secretariat placed strong emphasis on environmental
(particularly climate) and fiscal consequences of fossil fuel subsidies, but less on
macroeconomic and distributive consequences. The fiscal emphasis is evident in that
subsidies are measured in terms of budgetary expenditure and tax expenditure, i.e. their
impact on public budgets, an emphasis also present in the OECD’s work on agricultural
subsidies. The light emphasis on macroeconomic consequences is notable considering the
macroeconomic objectives of the OECD.
In sum, how the OECD addressed fossil fuel subsidies has been shaped by the orga-
nizational culture (Proposition 2a) and more indirectly by institutional interaction
(Proposition 1) with the WTO (and the World Bank and the IEA in the cases of the joint
reports to the G20) but not the G20. Given the commitment of the OECD staff—partic-
ularly chief OECD expert on fossil fuel subsidies Ron Steenblik—to the conferred-benefits
approach (Steenblik 2003), it is unlikely that the OECD would have defined the issue
differently if the organization had had more autonomy from its principal. OECD staff
played an important role in seizing the opportunity and produced reports on their own
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initiative (e.g. OECD 2015), in this way acting as policy entrepreneurs (Proposition 2b).
Although the bureaucratic culture constituted the space within which the policy entre-
preneurs had to operate, they nonetheless had considerable freedom within this space to
determine how much emphasis to place on, for example, the environmental consequences
of fossil fuel subsidies.
8 Conclusions
The two organizations differ notably in their definitions of fossil fuel subsidies, with the
IMF using a price-gap definition that constitutes a radical break with previous definitions,
while the OECD follows a more conventional path. The IMF to a larger degree than the
OECD framed fossil fuel subsidies in environmental terms (climate change and local air
pollution). This is surprising, since, unlike the OECD, the IMF does not have a strong
environmental profile.
In terms of the propositions explaining the differences in IO output, institutional
interaction (Proposition 1)—more precisely the G20 commitment—lifted OECD
involvement in fossil fuel subsidies to a new level, yet without influencing how the IO
addressed the subsidies. This was to some degree influenced by interaction with the WTO,
and to a lesser degree the World Bank and the IEA. Such interaction did not influence the
IMF, which was not requested by the G20 to address fossil fuel subsidies, but did so on the
initiative of IMF staff. IMF staff acting as policy entrepreneurs are also the main reason
why the IMF to a larger degree than the OECD framed fossil fuel subsidies in environ-
mental terms (thus supporting Proposition 2b): IMF staff linked the macroeconomic and
environmental framing of such subsidies on the basis of the neoclassical notion of getting
the price right. The differences in how the organizations addressed fossil fuel subsidies
were also influenced by their bureaucratic cultures (supporting Proposition 2a): the IMF
framed the environmental impact in the above-mentioned neoclassical way, and the OECD
framed fossil fuel subsidies in a fashion reflecting how it had addressed other subsidies.
The degree of autonomy of the IOs proved to be an important scope condition for the
influence of bureaucratic culture and policy entrepreneurs, in this way supporting Propo-
sition 3a. This is evident in that the IMF, to a greater degree than the OECD, adopted
positions running against the preferences of its member states, most notably the claim that
industrialized countries have significant fossil fuel subsidies. The OECD had less auton-
omy and only got the mandate to scrutinize its members’ subsidies after the G20 com-
mitment. The differences between the two organizations demonstrate that differences in
membership and voting rules did not have an impact, as the IMF contradicted member
states that are more influential within the IMF than within the OECD, thus undermining
Proposition 3b.
On a theoretical level, the article contributed to the study of IOs by demonstrating the
importance of including interaction with other institutions. Intra-bureaucratic factors may
be the key factor shaping how an IO addresses an issue, but institutional interaction and
principal-agent relations constitute key scope conditions for which actions are possible for
these bureaucracies. In the case of the OECD and other IOs with limited autonomy from
their principal, IO interaction may increase the room for manoeuver. Furthermore, the
analysis underscores the added academic value of focusing on how fossil fuel subsidies are
defined. Future research could build coherent knowledge concerning how institutional
interaction influences IO behaviour, inter alia by looking at entire institutional complexes.
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